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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous research on spreadsheet risks has predominantly focussed on errors inadvertently 
introduced by spreadsheet writers i.e. it focussed on the “end-user aspects” of spreadsheet 
development. When analyzing a faulty spreadsheet, one might not be able to determine whether a 
particular error (fault) has been made by mistake or with fraudulent intentions. However, the 
fences protecting against fraudulent errors have to be different from those shielding against 
inadvertent mistakes. 
 
 Faults resulting from errors committed inadvertently can be prevented ab initio by tools that 
notify the spreadsheet writer about potential problems whereas faults that are introduced on 
purpose have to be discovered by auditors without the cooperation of their originators. Even 
worse, some spreadsheet writers will do their best to conceal fraudulent parts of their 
spreadsheets from auditors. In this paper we survey the available means for fraud protection by 
contrasting approaches suitable for spreadsheets with those known from fraud protection for 
conventional software. 
 
1 MOTIVATION 
 
The economic significance of spreadsheet errors is documented by the spectacular cases 
listed on the EuSpRIG web site [EuSpRIG]. The high frequency of errors of various kinds 
is documented by a host of empirical studies. An overview of these studies can be found 
in [Panko 00] or seen on Ray Panko’s web site [Panko]. However, they could not reveal 
the motives underlying a particular error. Even in the study we did a while ago [Clermont 
et. al, 02] or in other un-documented assessments of sheets, we cannot state for sure that 
none of the deficiencies identified had a fraudulent background. We can only state that 
the way the original spreadsheet developers cooperated lets us assume that the majority of 
errors – if not all – were introduced without any hidden purpose. 
 
Due to the Sarbanes-Oxley act, managers cannot rely on such well-meaning assumptions.  
Hence, research has to look deeper into the causes and consequences of spreadsheet 
errors. In this context it is important to note that risk prevention strategies always have to 
start at the head of the chain of problems to identify proper mechanisms to prevent them. 
For example, assuming that the kind of problems spreadsheet writers are dealing with 
remains of the same nature, investing in a person’s spreadsheet specific education will 
  
 hopefully have a positive impact on the error rates of the sheets this person writes1. This 
investment will, however, be without any effect, or possibly even have negative effects, if 
this particular employee is introducing errors on purpose. 
 
To survey mechanisms protecting against the fraudulent introduction of faults or the frau-
dulent modifications of spreadsheets, one might review the general literature on software 
fraud considering the differences between spreadsheets and software developed by state 
of the art third generation languages and their respective professional development 
processes [Baskerville 93].  
 
In the following sections we first consider general software crime and related protection 
mechanisms as well as the specific distinguishing features of spreadsheets. Based on 
these considerations, we will look at fraud protection mechanisms for spreadsheets. 
Unfortunately, we have to conclude that instantiating a comprehensive strategy still 
requires actions by both vendors of spreadsheet software and by the respective user 
organizations. Last but not least, it requires further research. 
 
 
2 SOFTWARE CRIME 
 
2.1 Strategies Dealing with Conventional Software     
 
With conventional software systems, the distinction between program and data is clearly 
defined. In its weakest form, we have the compilation process as a universal frontier 
between software development, or its modification during maintenance, and the use of 
this software by having it operate on some data. Normally, users are distinct from deve-
lopers and usually, software development is even further decoupled from its use, e.g. by 
distinguishing between development machines and production computers. Organizational 
precautions will ensure that there is only a one-way street from development to operation. 
 
This distinction allows for a clear separation of the strategies protecting against frauds 
due to data manipulation and frauds due to software manipulation per se. Thus, frauds on 
the data level can be addressed by specific access rights. While fraudulent data manipula-
tions can be made more difficult by the specific design of the data base schema or by 
incorporating cross checks in the application software, such strategies would have only a 
reduced effect were there to be no separation between developers and users.  
 
The main strategy for assuring that software performs to its specification and only to its 
specification lies in the general quality assurance mechanisms of reviews and in testing. 
The advantage of reviews is that they can be made early in the development process. For 
fraud protection they will normally be executed in the form of inspections with item-lists 
specifically geared towards the identification of hidden functionality. The specifics of 
such lists are, as usual with inspections, language specific.  
 
The systematic approach inherent in anti-fraud inspections has also to be used for anti-
fraud testing. Among the vast spectrum of testing methods proposed, see [Zhu 97], one 
would specifically select functional testing methodologies. However, the problem is that 
one ought to test against the presence of code that is not required in the specification or – 
assuming the design has been adequately reviewed – not foreseen in the design of this 
                                                 
1 ) This positive assumption seems invalidated by [Panko, Sprague 97] claiming that the error rate 
is invariable with respect to seniority of the spreadsheet developers. However, this data is based on 
tasks of different complexity. Here, we assume risk specific education.  
  
 particular software. To account for this, mutation testing [Murnane, Reed 01] might be an 
adequate approach. 
 
Finally, the interaction of data and software might also be used. Placing specific inter-
mediate assertions will help to ensure that even intermediate results have to remain in 
correspondence with the conditions asserted. They are important in the fraud prevention 
context because persons operating with the system cannot use clever tricks – an 
alternative they might have even in the presence of openly visible checksums – to 
circumvent them. Assertions are embedded in code and therefore hidden from the user.  
 
An aspect to be considered in conventional software that is less relevant for spreadsheets 
is that of hardware related frauds. The assumption is that spreadsheet users, be they also 
developers or only parametric users, have the sheet on their own PC. Hence, except for 
special cases, we can see almost no room for the use of encryption of data. Privacy 
aspects dealt with in the literature on security, specifically on the literature on data base 
security [Pernul et.al. 98] are relevant in general though. They are relevant concerning 
source data used in spreadsheet computations and in the transmission of spreadsheet 
results if those are to be used by persons other than the person operating a sheet. 
 
2.2 Spreadsheet Specifics 
 
Before checking to which extent the strategy “Lets do for spreadsheets what serves well 
for conventional software!” is used, one has to consider the differences between general 
software and spreadsheets.  
 
A basic difference usually dwelt upon is that conventional software is produced by 
software professionals and spreadsheet software is developed by end users. Embarking 
too much on this difference would be dangerous though. It invites one equating end users 
with people of limited technical capability. This assumption could be quite misleading. 
Though spreadsheets can be written without too much in-depth knowledge of either 
programming or modelling, those that are subject to fraud are definitely not written by 
novices. One should rather assume that they are developed by personnel who, though 
being classified as end users, are well versed in both the domain they are working in and 
in spreadsheets themselves. 
 
Spreadsheet writers differ from professional software developers, though, by following 
another development process. While 3GL software is usually created by following a 
rather structured development process based on some kind of specification, spreadsheets 
are usually written in a much more explorative fashion [Nardi, Miller, 1990]. 
  
This might be a consequence of the fact that, in contrast to spreadsheet development 
where developers unite all three roles, in the case of conventional software, the require-
ments owner and programmer are different individuals. Thus, even with relatively un-
structured agile processes, specific steps have to be followed to allow for the coordinated 
effort of several people. Furthermore, even if the process is free from formal specifica-
tions, there are documents – whether in form of story cards [Beck 05] or in more conven-
tional form is of secondary importance only – that can serve as reference points against 
which particular pieces of the system can be verified. With end user programming, i.e. 
whenever the requirements owner and the developer collapse into a single person, such 
reference documents seem to become unnecessary. Hence they exist only rarely. Even if 
the spreadsheet writer develops an explicit, written model of what is to be casted into the 
computations performed by the sheet and even if an independent design of the sheet has 
been made, these documents usually do not have the rigor of professional documentation. 
  
  
Therefore, while the development of classical software will produce some upstream 
documents that can serve as reference points for the final code, this option is not available 
in spreadsheet development. Thus, the fact that the spreadsheet is written by a domain 
expert has severe direct and indirect consequences for fraud prevention strategies. 
 
Besides these process-related aspects, one has to consider the tool itself. 3GL software is 
written with the support of some development tool, an editor that might be arbitratily 
independent of the language used. The formal text (source code) thus written is 
transformed in an automated step (compilation) to executable code. Only then is the 
compiled code applied to the data it is assumed to transform or to process. Spreadsheets, 
on the contrary, offer a 2(+1)-dimensional arrangement of cells such that each cell can be 
either empty, contain a constant value, or a formula. Constant values can be considered to 
be either part of the program, serving as constants or labels, or as data to be processed, 
which would be called ‘input’ if we were discussing conventional, 3GL programs. 
 
The analogy of output is missing insofar as each cell that has some contents displays its 
value, irrespective of whether this value is to be assumed as result of the spreadsheet 
model or whether it is just an intermediate. Methodologies prescribe modularizing sheets 
such that distinct input-, computation-, and output areas appear on the sheet [Ronen et al., 
89], [Burnett, 01]. However, these methodologies are observed only to a limited extent 
and one may also raise arguments against their adoption. 
 
This coupling of program with data has, however, severe consequences for quality assu-
rance and authentication  procedures. Certainly, one could test spreadsheets in the same 
way as conventional programs are tested. In the conventional case, however, the tester is 
free from the risk of inadvertently changing the program; with spreadsheets, this risk can 
only be controlled by cell protection and/or locking mechanisms [Burnett et. al., 01]. 
 
 
3 PROTECTION MECHANISMS FOR SPREADSHEETS 
 
In this section we discuss mechanisms for protecting spreadsheets against errors intro-
duced in a fraudulent manner. Before delving deeper into this issue, it is important to say 
that fraud is a socio-psychological phenomenon with economic consequences. Hence, as 
with other social or psychological phenomena, technical means alone are insufficient and 
technical or methodological means cannot prevent fraud. They can only establish barriers 
that are difficult to overcome. Ingenious people, however, will always be smart enough 
either to overcome or to circumvent such barriers. Hence, organizational means are 
necessary to embed the recommendations discussed below in an appropriate, organiza-
tion-specific manner to avoid having malicious users being able to circumvent what is 
placed in front of them to protect the integrity of models and computations. 
 
Having said so, we discuss in the following sections how reviewing, testing, the place-
ment of assertions, and authentication – techniques taken from general software fraud 
protection – can be used to protect spreadsheets against the incorporation of fraud-
permissive code or against fraudulent modifications. 
 
3.1 Reviews and Inspections 
 
In conventional software development, inspections, though still not universally used in 
practice, are attributed to be the most effective error detection process steps [Endres, 
Rombach 03, Rombach et.al., 02]. Interestingly, not all software in use has been subjected 
  
 to a review while nobody would trust an untested piece of software. The fact that people 
trust more in the less strong testing technology than in reviews should be an important 
point to consider when devising a comprehensive fault prevention strategy. It also 
constitutes an interesting research question in its own right. 
 
There are several forms of reviews, distinguished by their purpose, position in the 
development cycle and the particular techniques applied. The techniques range from 
walkthroughs to inspections. While walkthroughs amount essentially to a manual 
execution of the programme in a particular group setting, inspections usually check code 
linearly against specific deficiencies. The deficiencies are taken from a list that contains 
items that are known to be particularly error prone within the given development context. 
However, one might follow different reading strategies [Biffl, 01]. Reviewing 
development products from pre-coding phases normally requires a specific reading 
strategy that takes care of the non-linearity of the contents of the respective document. In 
any case, one has the requirement that the full document is checked and the reading 
strategy has to ensure that nothing is missed. 
 
When checking spreadsheets, one has first to note that they do not share the linearity of 
3GL-programs. The arrangement of cells is two-dimensional on the sheet and if there are 
references between different sheets of a work-book, one might consider a spreadsheet as 
three-dimensional arrangement of interrelated cells. Hence, particular recommendations 
for a reading strategy are needed. Of course, one might follow a line-by-line, column-by-
column strategy. This will ensure that each cell is checked, a requirement called for by 
most recommendations [Rothermel, 01; Sajaniemi, 98; Burnett, 01]. However, one might 
doubt whether the high number of cells present in professional spreadsheets makes this 
strategy productive. Cell references can stretch over arbitrary distances and hence this 
pseudo-linear reading might miss important semantic relationships, relationships that 
were placed (or missed) with fraudulent intentions. 
 
Further, the fact that many spreadsheets contain substantial portions of a repetitive nature 
must be considered. If ignored, reviewers may become bored with a resulting loss in care 
and attention. However, becoming bored or tired is a problem for any kind of reviews. 
Therefore, irrespective of the special review strategies, reviewing methodologies call for 
strict time limits to be observed in review sessions. 
 
The work of the Klagenfurt group proposes strategies to lessen this effect. In [Ayalew et 
al., 00; Clermont 03], logical areas are proposed. They group cells of identical content 
into sets that can then be checked as sets on their defining basis. Originally, this concept 
was developed to identify differences between regularity in the layout and regularity in 
the semantic content of a cell. An empirical evaluation [Clermont et. al, 02] has shown 
that the related tool for supporting a reviewer not only has a high detective power – even 
in sheets that were considered correct, the reviewer found error rates that are in line with 
those reported in the literature [Panko, 98] – it also dramatically lessens the time needed 
for performing the inspections.  
 
This effect is to be expected by comparing the approach to other software certification 
strategies. In conventional software development, (full) path testing is accepted as the 
most thorough coverage strategy. In practice, full path testing is infeasible though 
[Weyuker 86]. Hence, one embarks on less rigorous strategies such as simple path tests 
where for each loop at least one case that executes the body and one case that misses the 
loop body are run. 
 
  
 With spreadsheets, we assume that the analogues of loops are cells with content copied 
from other cells. The finiteness of the (2+1) dimensions of the sheet would allow an 
exhaustive assessment of each cell. However, performing just a check of each logical area 
amounts exactly to what is checked with a simple path test. Moreover, since the areas are 
identified automatically, even minor differences in arbitrarily complex cell contents will 
be identified. Thus, if fraudulent modifications lead to irregularity in structures, reviewers 
are specifically pointed to such spots. If fraudulent modifications lead to consistent 
modification, the reduced number of items to be considered improves the chance that they 
do not slip the attention of the reviewers. 
 
The concept of grouping repetitive structures for review purposes can be extended to 
groups of cells that are defined according to a repetitive pattern. With the so defined 
semantic classes [Mittermeir, Clermont 02], even higher levels of aggregation can be 
safely checked for fraudulent deviations.  
 
These concepts have been formally defined in [Clermont, 03] where an orthogonal 
concept based on the data flow between semantic units is additionally defined. With this, 
a reviewing discipline is proposed that is (or strives to be) in accordance with the applica-
tion model formulated by the spreadsheet. How the concepts just described can be 
combined for auditing has been described in [Clermont, Mittermeir, 03]. There, three 
specific reading strategies for spreadsheets are proposed. 
 
It should be mentioned here that in searching for fraud, several rounds of passing through 
a sheet are necessary and these rounds might follow different sheet traversal strategies 
[Biffl, Halling, 03]. While a check for accessing files that do not belong to the legitimate 
interface might be done automatically by a line-wise or column-wise check of each cell 
(including hidden cells!), auditing the algorithm itself might instead require a trace along 
or against the flow of data. A rather selective strategy might be to check for cases where a 
choice of misleading labels can lead to effects that are to be prevented. 
 
3.2. Testing 
 
Research on testing conventional software has produced a host of literature (see [Zhu 97, 
Hierons 02] for an overview). Rothermel and his co-authors proposed a specific testing 
methodology for spreadsheets [Rothermel 01].   
 
Given Dijkstra’s statement that testing can only show the presence of faults, but never 
their absence [Dijkstra 72], the high emphasis on testing might be surprising. Dijkstra’s 
remark applies in an analogous manner to fraudulent deviations of a program from what 
should be the program following its specification. In fact, testing is weaker than either 
proofs or checking against specifications in a review. The reason for this is that the latter 
two deal with a program in its intentional form while testing deals only with a sample 
taken from the possible extensions of input-output transformations to be performed by a 
program. Hence, while testing can only raise the level of confidence one can have in the 
correctness of a program, its fault detection characteristics are sufficiently different from 
those of reviews or proofs so that any solid quality management strategy would employ a 
mix of these quality assurance strategies [Mittermeir, 04].  
 
A basic assumption of testing is that it is performed after coding is completed. In 
industrial software production, the separation of the coding and testing phases is even 
emphasised by having different personnel for programming and for testing and clear 
prescriptions on the quality a module has to have before it is to be passed to the testing 
group and subjected to formal testing. Configuration management systems and special 
  
 conventions are needed to ensure that there is no conflict of versions between testing and 
correcting.  
 
Due to the integration of data and code, such assumptions seem problematic with 
spreadsheets. Any change of (input-) data might, by mistake, lead to a change in the 
program itself. Further, manual instrumentation of (normal) spreadsheets seems 
impossible, since such changes would distort not only the internal structure of the sheet, 
but also its external appearance. Cell protection might be an answer to the risk of 
inadvertently changing a cell that belongs to the “program part” rather than to the “input 
part” of the sheet. Doing so on a discretionary basis might itself be error prone if one 
aims at testing to raise the confidence in the functional correctness of the sheet. If one 
plans to use testing as fraud identification strategy, however, it would appear to be totally 
insufficient. 
 
To improve confidence in testing as a fraud identification strategy, two changes seem 
mandatory: 
a) the physical separation of data from code, 
b) the temporal separation of data changes from changes in code. 
 
The first requirement is approached by having methods ensuring firstly specific regions 
of the sheet for each one of the three categories: input cells, “code”, and cells bearing 
final results. Secondly, block-wise protection locks are needed for the latter two 
categories of cells. To provide separation with a higher level of protection from the 
system would, however, require a methodology where workbooks are structured in data-
sheets and program sheets such that the front sheet shows only input values and the final 
result values. Computations would then take place on a different sheet (or possibly on a 
stack of different sheets) of the workbook.  
 
This separation will require some discipline from the developers, but it does not really 
raise the overall complexity. In contrast to other proposals that recommend separation of 
formulas from input cells, here the lower level sheets can be prepared in exactly the 
manner in which they would have been prepared anyway. Even the initial desk checks 
might be done by the original spreadsheet writer as she or he used to do. Only before 
submitting the sheet to testing, all values in intended “input cells” have to be replaced by 
a reference to the respective cell on the front sheet and, for all “output cells”, the front 
sheet has to get a simple reference to the respective “program sheet”. Labelling 
information still has to be copied to the “front sheet” containing the value view of this 
spreadsheet model. This could, however, be done with tool support if one follows 
labelling identification strategies such as proposed by [Hipfl, 04].  
 
However, in the fraud prevention case, the crucial issue remains whether the sheet that 
has been tested will also be the sheet that is actually used in operation. To achieve this, 
one would need to totally and finally remove the code modification capability from the 
person operating the sheet. The OpenOffice extension TellTable [Nash et al, 04] supports 
this strategy by placing the real spreadsheet on a protected server. Users operate on a 
view of the sheet presented via a VNC client. Thus, they are allowed to perform 
parametric variation of the sheet while the algorithmic core is protected and can be 
changed only by a special group of users. This separation of interface from internals of 
the sheet would also enhance auditability of change traces. With tools supporting 
focussed analysis of modification histories [Baxter, 04], auditors can efficiently ensure 
that the sheets in operation are still conformant to those that have been certified 
previously. 
 
  
 Another answer to this issue would be to use compiled spreadsheets. Compiled spread-
sheets seem to be not really an additional burden on the spreadsheet development process. 
The spreadsheet compiler would just clearly define the boundary between development 
and operation. In fact, the compiled spreadsheet would, from the user’s point of view, just 
consist of the “front sheet” proposed above. However, this front sheet is not manually 
constructed but prepared by the spreadsheet compiler. Underneath this front sheet, there 
can be arbitrarily optimized code that might be protected in a highly professional manner. 
 
It is to be seen that the advantage of using a spreadsheet compiler over the use of 
protected cells might be limited for the initial version of a spreadsheet. However, those 
sheets that are fraud-critical usually have a long lifespan during which they get modified. 
With the compiler solution, a trace history over the various versions of such sheets has 
the compilation run as a clearly defined event that marks the creation of a new version. 
 
A word of caution still has to be said. As with searching for errors, searching for frauds is 
exploring the open universe against the finite space of the specified (or intended) 
solution. However, in seeking errors, one has a rich empirical basis for the kinds of errors 
humans commit. In the case of seeking for fraudulent deviations from the specified (or 
intended) solution, this experience base is very limited. Hence, the identification of 
appropriate test data sets, which basically amounts to a very carefully designed sampling 
strategy, is much more difficult and laden with risk.  
 
3.3. Assertions 
 
Assertions are a strategy for relating program code to its specification and, if the 
assertions are to be executed during operation, for checking whether the state defined by 
the operation of the program on a particular stream of input data conforms to the 
specification. 
 
With spreadsheets, assertions play a limited role if one is not prepared to accept check-
sums as a weak proxy of such assertions. However, we see in the work of Ayalew 
[Ayalew 01, Ayalew et al, 00] a certain approximation to assertions that might have some 
merit in fraud prevention. His idea was to have a layer underneath the normal spreadsheet 
on which the ranges to be assumed by the values of selected cells can be specified. Using 
interval arithmetic, the specified ranges can then be compared with the ranges resulting 
from executing the functions and operations of the original spreadsheets on the ranges of 
cells higher up in the data flow. This allows establishing inclusion relationships between 
the actual value, the computed range, and the expected range of result cells. Deviations 
will point to potential faults in either the spreadsheet writer’s model or in its 
implementation in the original spreadsheet.  
 
While the direct transfer of this idea to fraud prevention might be of limited use, its 
generalization seems highly promising. It offers a layer underneath the spreadsheet that is 
under the application expert’s control and that checks certain spots of the sheet in a way 
that is not directly accessible to the application expert operating the sheet. Thus, 
modifications of the original sheet will be possible as long as these modifications remain 
within the competencies granted to this person. Obviously, this also requires additional 
protection mechanisms as discussed in connection with a spreadsheet compiler. 
 
3.4. Authentification 
 
Finally, one has to point to classical security mechanisms such as authentification or 
water marking ([Craver et al., 98], [Collberg et. al., 99]). Both rest on cryptographic tech-
  
 niques and would, to be of practical use, require compiled sheets or at least a strong 
physical separation between data and code.  
 
The idea is basically that the content of the program portion of the sheet is subjected to 
some cryptographic encoding such that any modification in the program would lead to a 
different cipher. Consequently, the program is sealed against unauthorised changes and 
users of this program can be sure that they used the program they intended to use and not 
some slightly modified clone of it.  
 
Since adequate treatment of this topic would extend the scope of this paper, we refer to 
the related literature for cryptographic protection of conventional software (c.f. [Devanbu, 
Stubblebine, 00]). Here, the differences between conventional software and spreadsheets 
will not matter as long as one can clearly separate code from data. It is to be understood, 
however, that applying any of the techniques discussed above, regardless of how efficient 
or effective they might be for dealing with inadvertent errors, will be wasted effort as 
long as one cannot be sure that the sheet that was operated was the sheet that has been 
previously examined.  
 
 
4. SUMMARY 
 
Though spreadsheets have to be understood as programs written in a very high level 
programming language, mechanisms to protect them against fraud have to recognize the 
substantial differences between them and classical software. Key to these differences is 
that the multi-person process, which is inherent in conventional software production and 
has a clear differentiation of roles, is lost in favour of a single person process. The latter is 
apparently much harder to control from the outside. Intermediate documents that might 
otherwise serve as reference points are usually missing. To compensate for this, 
organizational measures have to be put in place. Likewise, one has to take care of the fact 
that spreadsheet systems work in an interpretative mode and that data and program is not 
necessarily separated on spreadsheets. 
 
Separation of data and “program” will eventually be a key requirement when one wants 
to protect spreadsheets against fraudulent modifications, but we must be aware that this 
would radically change the way spreadsheets are used and developed. Up to now, the 
approaches suggesting separating input data from programs proper have, in practice, not 
been blessed with high acceptance.  
 
Inspections of various sorts might help to check sheets. Techniques that have analogous 
effects to loop aggregation might improve the efficiency and even the effectiveness of 
such reviews and testing approaches will also have their place in fraud prevention. 
However, all effort invested will be futile as long as one cannot be sure that the 
spreadsheet assessed will be the spreadsheet executed. This assurance can be given by 
cryptographic methods. However, they require a clear identification of what is code and 
what is data. 
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